Journal of Philosophy and Linguistics
Research Article Peer-review, Open Access

Game Against Picture: A Comparative Analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Language Theories

Victor Chizi Ihunda[1]

Remigius Achinike Obah[2]

Abstract: This study is a comparative Analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Language Game Theory as against his Picture Theory. The attempt by Wittgenstein to dissolve the philosophical problem of language had brought about two unique theories of language: picture theory of meaning and meaning as use in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* respectively. This paper employed the method of content and textual analysis. This work finds and observed that Wittgenstein saw language as a descriptive activity that ought to mirror the world. Hence, in speaking about the world, elementary proposition should represent atomic facts. His latter concept: meaning as use took a U-turn, recognizing the social and instrumental function of language. However, in spite of the uniqueness of both perspectives of language by Wittgenstein, in our comparative analysis, we argued in support of his latter view: meaning as use. The usage of language is an activity that is a quintessential hallmark of humans and human society. This paper therefore recommends and concludes that, unlike the picture theory of meaning that narrowly emphasizes the symbolic or representative function of language, the concept of meaning as use is less rigid and accommodates the intricate and diverse functions of language beyond the parochial function of merely ensuring that elementary propositions mirror atomic fact.

Keywords: Picture Theory, Picture, Game, Meaning as Use, Language.

[1]*Department of Philosophy, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria*

[2]*Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria*

Introduction

This paper entitled, Game Against Picture: A Comparative Analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein Language Theories is concerned with Wittgenstein's attempt to deal with, or as he puts it, his attempt to dissolve the philosophical problem of language. The concepts of picture theory of meaning and meaning as use are both central to his works; *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations* respectively. What philosophical problem of language led Wittgenstein to the postulation of picture theory of meaning and subsequently, his concept of meaning as use? The problem he thinks is this: that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 3). The attempt at solving or in the words of Wittgenstein dissolving this philosophical problem could be traced back to Russell and Frege's conceptions of logic and language (Fann 1969, p. 6). Specifically, in the *Tractatus* we could see logical analysis with resemblance to Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein employs logical calculus to carry out the construction of his system. Explaining that only the propositions have sense; only in the context that a proposition has a name meaning. In the *Tractatus,* there is a vivid presentation of Frege's logic in the form of what is now known as the truth-tables. This afforded Wittgenstein with the means to go back and analyze all propositions into their atomic parts given that he considers every statement about complexes can be analyzed into a statement about the constituent parts.

The picture theory of meaning as put forth by Wittgenstein was considered a solution to the aforementioned philosophical problem of language. Beginning with the principles of symbolism and the relations which are necessary between words and things in any language, Wittgenstein sought to show the logical structure of propositions and the nature of logical inference. By emphasis on symbolism, he was concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language. Thus, meaning would be grounded in its representative function (Wittgenstein 1974, p. x). After, a couple of years came a paradigm shift in some of the basic assumptions of Wittgenstein with regards to what meaning is. As a product of the new development of his latter thought, Wittgenstein invites us to discard his former conception of meaning in the picture theory where elementary propositions ought to mirror atomic facts to be meaningful and embrace meaning as use.

Wittgenstein's Problem of Language and the Birth of the *Tractatus*

A comparative analysis of Wittgenstein's concepts of picture theory of meaning and meaning as use cannot be adequately appreciated without the necessary background and perceived philosophical problems that spurred him to create such concepts in the first place. The philosophical system erected by Wittgenstein like many other philosophical systems did not just emerge out of the blues, but owes its emergence to a traditional philosophical problem. The problem is precisely a problem of language, or more precisely, a problem of meaning. In terms of influence, it is believed that Wittgenstein's interest in the philosophical problem of language "evolved as a continuation of reaction to Russell and Frege's conceptions of logic and language" (SEP 2021).

While traditional philosophy could be characterized as distinct attempts at answering the panoply of philosophical questions, it could be said of Wittgenstein's philosophy that it bears the hallmark of a systematic attempt at questioning the questions themselves. "He is reported to have said that he did not solve philosophical problems but dissolved them" (Fann 1969, p. xii). At this juncture, a critical question pertaining to the actual intention behind Wittgenstein's philosophy and what exactly he sought to achieve needs to be raised. It is common knowledge that Wittgenstein's intellectual development is often divided into two as chiefly embodied in both of his works; *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) and *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) published posthumously. Thus, we ought to be specific in our reference to Wittgenstein considering the apparently contrastive nature of both works. In the preface to the *Tractatus.* Wittgenstein explicitly stated that the intention of his book was to deal with the problems of philosophy, and to demonstrate the reason for these problems is due to the fact that the logic of our language is misunderstood. Thus, his aim was to prove that, "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 3). In this introduction to the *Tractatus,* Bertrand Russell succinctly explains the intended goal of Wittgenstein and the relevance of his work to philosophical discourses thus:

> Starting from the principles of Symbolism and the relations which are necessary between words and things in any language, it applies the result of this inquiry to

> various departments of traditional philosophy, showing in each case how traditional philosophy and traditional solutions arise out of ignorance of the principles of Symbolism and out of misuse of language (Wittgenstein 1974, p. ix).

Broadly, a predominant current in the *Tractatus* was a preoccupation with the perennial problem of the nexus between thought or language, and the physical world. Also, the idea that there must be *a priori* order in the world was a conviction of the young Wittgenstein never questioned. The world he believed has a fixed structure and language ought to reflect this structure. (Fann 1969, p. 6).

Central Tenets of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

In order for us to make sense of the central tenets of the *Tractatus,* it should be noted that a part of Wittgenstein theory of language largely deals with symbolism. By symbolism, we mean that every proposition ought to mean something quite definite. He is basically concerned with the conditions that he thinks ought to be met by a logically perfect language. This logically perfect language he believes ought to exhibit the necessary nexus between language and the world. Thus, he is concerned with the conditions of accurate symbolism.

The *Tractatus* is such a unique work with a structure that presents Wittgenstein's arguments in about seven basic propositions, with each of the seven proposition further expanded to its logical conclusion. The seven basic propositions include the following;

i. "The world is all that is the case'
ii. 'What is the case -a fact -is the existence of states of affairs'
iii. 'A logical picture of facts is a thought'
iv. 'A thought is a proposition with a sense'
v. 'A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself)'
vi. 'The general form of a truth-function is [pj,N()]. (This is the general form of a proposition)'
vii. 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'" (Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 5-89)

It seems quite apparent from the above mentioned seven basic propositions of Wittgenstein that his prime focus is the problem of philosophy which pertains to the world, thought and language. Thus, he sought to address this matter by logic and through the nature of representation or symbolism.

Language and the Picture Theory of Meaning

The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is majorly a thesis of Wittgenstein's theory of language and it consists of mainly two components namely; the picture theory of meaning and the truth-function theory. The both theories are meant to address the following issues; 'what is the function of language?' and 'what is the structure of language?' given that language is considered as, "the totality of proposition" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 22). These two questions lead us to the following: 'How are propositions related to the world?' and 'How are propositions related to one another?' Apparently, Wittgenstein believes that, "if we can use language to talk about the world there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth or falsity are not determined by other propositions but by the world, these he called elementary propositions" (Fann 1969, p. 10). Emphasizing the primacy of language, Russell puts this differently in his introduction to the *Tractatus* thus:

> Mr Wittgenstein is concerned with conditions for a logically perfect language -not that any language is logically perfect, or that we believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing a logically perfect language, but that the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfils this function in proportion as it approaches the ideal language which we postulate (Wittgenstein 1974, p. x).

The major task of language as conceived by Wittgenstein is the task of asserting or denying facts. Putting into consideration the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the component words is known. Thus, regardless of how a language is constructed, for a given sentence to assert a certain fact there must be a similarity between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. The

elementary propositions he referred to as propositions that are directly connected with the world, that is, they symbolize a fact of the world. Non-elementary propositions on the other hand are understood via elementary propositions; their truth or falsity are determined by (or are a function of) the elementary propositions (Spiegelberg 1968, p, 226). The question at this juncture is: how are elementary propositions connected to the world, and how are nonelementary or complex propositions related to the elementary propositions? Wittgenstein explains that elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts; the basic kind of fact which cannot be further divided or analyzed. And all complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary ones (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 44). In order to grasp Wittgenstein's proposed solution, it is necessary that we understand that his method of analysis was necessitated *a priori* (Fann 1969, p. 8). This is better explained by the following line:

> Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein sees the world as consisting of facts, rather than the traditional atomistic conception of a world made up of objects. Facts are existent states of affairs, and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects. Objects are simple but objects can fit together in various determinate ways. They may have various properties and may hold diverse relations to one another. Objects combine with one another according to their logical, internal properties. That is to say that an object's internal properties determine the possibilities of its combination with other objects; this the logical form (SEP 2021).

Therefore, states of affairs which are comprised of objects in combination, are by their nature complex. The states of affairs which do exist can possibly have been otherwise. This implies that states of affairs are either actual, that is, in existence or possible. It is the totality of states of affairs (the actual and possible) that constitutes the whole of reality. The world is precisely those states of affairs which do exist. The method employed by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* is purely an "*a priori* method intended to show that vague propositions are really not vague at all once their logical structures are revealed by analysis" (Fann 1969, p. 9). The process of analysis may continue indefinitely but if it is true that we can alter statements about the world then the process must inevitably at some point come to an end, and the end product must, somehow, be in direct representation of the world. Wittgenstein consistently maintained that all ordinary propositions regardless of how vague it is can be analyzed into a set of elementary propositions which comprises of simple term or names. Like many traditional philosophers, he assumed that there must be simple things, that is, objects that correspond to the names. Thus, the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. "A name refers to an object. The object is its reference" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 13). Hence, if objects do not exist, the elementary propositions would consist of terms without reference and would be senseless. "But since the sense of all propositions depends ultimately on that of the elementary ones, no proposition would have any sense, which is patently false. Hence, there must be objects" (Fann 1969, p. 13).

Wittgenstein posit that "the configuration of objects produces atomic facts, in atomic facts objects fit into one another like the links of chain" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 12). And from a point of language, the elementary propositions assert the existence of atomic facts. To assert the existence of the atomic facts is to describe the configuration of objects. Hence, the general form of propositions is: 'this is, how things are'. "If an elementary proposition is true, the atomic fact exists and if on the other hand, an elementary proposition is false, the atomic fact does not exist" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 25). From here we can clearly see a move from thought, language and the employment of his famous idea that thoughts, propositions are pictures. That the pictures as such is a model of reality. Having developed the above analysis of the world, thought, language and depending on the general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein asserts that all meaningful propositions are of equal value (Sullivan and Potter 2013). Thus, his emphasis pertaining to what can or cannot be said, thereby rendering outside the realm of sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics.

Sense and Nonsense Proposition

To a large extent, Wittgenstein's theory of language sees the function of language as mainly descriptive. To say anything is equivalent to describing something. Hence, he asserted that, the, "totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science" and "what can be said is identified as propositions of natural science or empirical propositions" (Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 27, 77). Through his establishment of his logical construction of proper usage of language, Wittgenstein draws the limits of world, thought and language in other to

distinguish between sense and nonsense. The condition for a proposition's having sense have been explored and seen to rest on the possibility of representation or picturing. Their names must necessarily have a reference or meaning, but they can only do so within the framework of a proposition which is held together by logical form. Given that only the propositions of natural sciences are within the realm of what can be said and have sense, Wittgenstein asserts that the propositions of logic, ethics, mathematics, aesthetics, metaphysics etc., do not say anything. They are senseless or nonsensical because they try to transcend through the usage of language, the limits of language and the world (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 88).

A proposition has sense in so far as it is a logical picture of the world but no proposition can be true *a priori.* Logical propositions are true a *priori,* they are tautologies and their negations are contradictions (Hacker 1996, p. 22). Thus, the propositions of logic say nothing, they are senseless but not nonsensical, for, "they show the formal-logical-properties of language and the world, or the limit of language and the world" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 89). Philosophical propositions are neither empirical nor logical, Wittgenstein thinks they are attempts to say things which cannot be said. This is what he has to say about philosophical propositions:

> Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answer to questions of the kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful) (Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 22-23).

However, he did admit that there are important things (moral and aesthetic values, etc.) that, although they cannot be said, can be shown. In his words, "they are what is mystical" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 88). It is the delineation of what can be said and what cannot be said, but only shown that he considered as the major problem of philosophy. Propositions can express nothing of what is higher. Hence, he considers ethics and aesthetics one and the same, they are both transcendental and so is religion. "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. (It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required)" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 88). Therefore, Wittgenstein concludes that "there are indeed, things that are inexpressible. They show themselves. They are what is mystical" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 89).

Philosophical Investigations

It is something a bit of a puzzle that the latter thoughts of Wittgenstein should be in sharp contrast to nearly everything argued for in the *Tractatus.* As about 1933 he had rejected the *Tractatus* conception of language - the picture theory of meaning as well as the theory of truth-functions. "The Blue Book of 1933-34 testifies to his complete transition from the early work to a radically new philosophy which culminated in the *Investigations"* (Fann 1969, p. 55). Personally, speaking of factors which prompted the paradigm shift in his thinking, Wittgenstein wrote in the preface to his *Philosophical Investigations* (1958):

> Four years ago, I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book. I was helped to realize these mistakes-to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate-by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life. Even more than to this-always certain and forcible- criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr. P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practiced on my thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book (Wittgenstein 1958, p. viii).

In juxtaposition with the *Tractatus* wherein he was predominantly concerned with the cognitive usage of language, in the *Philosophical Investigations,* he made more emphasis on the expressive dimension of language such as gestures, whose meanings are majorly determined by social contexts and concrete situations.

Therefore, use becomes more important, to the users and hence the society. The latter Wittgenstein came to regard the method and doctrines of the *Tractatus* as a paradigm of traditional philosophy. Thus, throughout his later writings the presuppositions and views of the *Tractatus* served as the main targets of his attack (Fann 1969. p. 55).

Philosophical Investigations began with a quote from Saint Augustine's confession which "gives us a particular picture of the essence of human language" based on the idea that "the words in language name objects" and "that sentences are combinations of such names" (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 2). Therefore, despite its plausibility, this reduction of language to representation cannot adequately do justice to the whole of human language, it is, as such a poor picture. And it is this picture theory of language that has been the definitive hallmark of traditional philosophy but Wittgenstein now thinks it has outlived its usefulness and therefore, needs to be jettisoned in place of a new approach to both language and philosophy. Remarking on his new paradigm shift in his theory of language in his *Blue Book,* Wittgenstein wrote; "I shall in the future again and again draw attention to what I shall call language-games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language" (Wittgenstein 1989, p. 17).

Meaning as Use

At this point, Wittgenstein has clearly rejected the meaningfulness of talking about the absolutely simple objects, the existence of elementary propositions and the notion of a final analysis. "Analysis is no longer the main philosophical method for him" (Fann 1969, p. 62). Therefore, it is this questioning of the existence of elementary propositions and the jettisoning of the possibility of a final analysis meant nothing less than a complete repudiation of his earlier conception of picture theory of meaning. Remarking on this transition, Fann says:

> In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein came to realize that the doctrines of the *Tractatus* rested on a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is the correspondence theory of meaning, the essence of which is this: the individual words in language name objects for which a word stands, is its meaning. The greater part of the *Investigation* is directed against this conception of language (or what he called the Augustinian conception of language) (Fann 1969, p. 63).

Wittgenstein argued that our urge to ask for the meaning of a word even when its use is perfectly clear arises from the philosophical concept of meaning that could be traced to a primitive idea of the way language functions. (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 3). He began the *Blue Book* asking the question "what is the meaning of a word?" This question like many other questions "What is time?", "What is truth?", "What is beauty"? etc., creates a mental cramp in us. "We feel that we cannot point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it)" (Wittgenstein 1989, p. 1). Wittgenstein believed that the phrase 'the meaning of a word' exercises a certain spell on us which results in the idea that there must be a thing (either an object or a quality) corresponding to each noun and adjective, that this thing is the meaning of the word, and is named by it as an individual is named by a proper name. Therefore, shattering this spell, he first suggested that instead of asking what is the meaning? We should rather ask, 'what is the explanation of the meaning?', he believed that this substitution brings the question down to earth and helps to cure us of the incessant temptation to look for some object which we might call the meaning (Kulkarni 1968, p 32). Subsequently, he admonishes us to refrain from asking for the meaning, and ask for the use. One advantage of the emphasis on use rather than meaning is that use carries with it no suggestion of an object corresponding to a word. Also, emphasis on use cannot be understood merely by looking at the word, it can only be understood merely by looking at the word, it can only be comprehended in contexts both linguistically and socially (Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 48-50).

Thus, "for a large class of cases -though not for all -in which we employ the word meaning it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 20-21). Wittgenstein asks us to compare words in language with tools in a box. That we should think of words as instruments characterized by their use. "Think of tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. The functions of words are diverse as functions of these objects" (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 6). From this analogy, we could clearly see the parallels. A word is characterized by its use just as a tool is

characterized by its function. This analogy draws our attention to the fact that words are used for different purposes and there is not a single function that all words have in common. Hence, the demand for a general theory of the meaning of words is considered pointless in the *Philosophical Investigations.*
Sentence as well as words may be understood as tools or instruments. When we become confused about the sense of a sentence, Wittgenstein offers us this advice: "Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment" (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 126). "Ask yourself: On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say this? What kind of actions accompany these words? In what sense will they be used; and what for?" (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 137). It is in this manner that we come to see how words and sentences are instruments used to accomplish certain purposes. From this we could see that language is not a tool serving one purpose but a collection of tools serving a variety of purposes. "Language is an instrumental. Its concepts are instruments" (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 151).

Game Against Picture: A Comparative Analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein Language Theories
From the discussions above, we can clearly see that Wittgenstein's intellectual development and contributions to philosophical discourse on language can be distinctly divided into two major periods, the first is represented by the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* and the second is represented by *Philosophical Investigations.* Here, we intend to compare and contrast the two distinct theories of Wittgenstein namely; the picture theory of meaning and meaning as use in the *Tractus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations respectively.* Wittgenstein himself wished to publish the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* together because, as he puts it, "The latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again..., I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book" (Wittgenstein 1958, p. x). What is the nature of the relationship between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations,* in fact, is there a relationship or they are antithetical to each other? Fann pointed out that the relationship between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* is a matter of controversy. On the one end of the spectrum of the controversy is the reference to the above referenced passage by Wittgenstein asserting that his latter thesis could be better understood in the light of the former by contrast. The passage is often interpreted to mean that, "Wittgenstein himself viewed the Investigations as a development or deepening of the *Tractatus,* and in fact, both the one and the other only makes sense when they are seen as complementary" (Fann 1969, p. xii). On the other end of the spectrum of the controversy, the majority of commentators seem to agree with Justus Hartnack in maintaining that, "no unbroken line leads from the *Tractatus* to the *Philosophical Investigations;* there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap. The thought of the later work is a negation of the thought of the earlier" (Charlesworth 1961, p. 76). Thus, while one strand asserts that the *Investigations,* as a whole, is a development of the *Tractatus,* the other strand claims that they are negations of each other.
Fann is of the opinion that, "the both interpretations are radically mistaken..., and it is important to distinguish clearly the part of the *Tractatus* which was repudiated from the part which was not" (Fann 1969, p. xii). Our engagement in a comparative analysis of the former and latter thesis of Wittgenstein particularly with regards to the picture theory of meaning and meaning as use shall be presented as follows:
First, while it is important to note that it is the same philosophical problem of language that led to both concepts of picture theory of meaning and meaning as use, the method used in arriving at the postulations of each of the thesis varies. While the picture theory of meaning in the *Tractatus* was arrived at by the methods of traditional theoretic construction (even though to construct only a ladder to be abandoned at the end), the concept of meaning as use as discussed in the *Investigations* adopted what Fann describes as the method of dialectics. This is due to the emphasis on the social dimension of language (Fann 1989, p. xiii).
Second, we could clearly observe that there is an apparent continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature and task of philosophy and not a disconnect like some scholars would have us believe. The view that led to the postulation of his picture theory of meaning in the *Tractatus:* that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, that philosophy is not science but an activity of elucidation and clarification, etc. persistently served as a major problem in the *Philosophical Investigations* which brought about the latter concept of meaning as use.
Third, the picture theory of meaning has as its ideal an obsession with exactness and precision when it come to our usage of language as conceived by Wittgenstein. Fann referred to it as an "eternal striving for absolute exactness and precision" (Fann 1969, p. 82). In the course of the *Philosophical Investigations,* we could clearly

see a shift. In repudiating the picture theory of meaning of the *Tractatus* and replacing it with meaning as use. Wittgenstein was apparently disillusioned that his, 'eternal striving for absolute exactness and precision' and now would settle for a theory of language that recognizes that language serves our ordinary purpose and social usage. In place of the emphasis of elementary propositions resembling atomic facts as maintained in the picture theory of meaning, we observed a shift, Wittgenstein now invites us to think of language as a toolbox containing different tools and each having a specific function. With the concept of meaning as use we noticed an emphasis of relative concepts such as language-game and family resemblance all in an attempt to demonstrate the quintessential social dimension of language. This feels like pulling down the philosophical discourses of language from the clouds of idealism to earth. "Instead of looking for the unifying principles, which obscure details and lead to abstracting of essences, he would rather draw our attention to case after case of real or imaginary uses of language" (Fann 1969, p. 82).

Fourth, there is an apparent shift from an ideal theory of language which is majorly essentialist in nature to a theory of language which exhibits some underling currents of pragmatism. Wittgenstein's attack on essentialism, his notion of family-resemblance, his use of extreme examples, and his emphasis on circumstances are all definitive hallmarks of his concept of meaning as use vis-à-vis his idea of picture theory of meaning. Fann believes that there is a striking similarity with his emphasis on meaning as use with William James' pragmatism (Fann 1969, p. 48). "The target of James' attack: the theorizing mind, oversimplification, the one-sided view, dogmatism, and the search for one essence are precisely the characteristics of the early Wittgenstein" (Fann 1969, p. 48).

Fifth, as part of the attempt to make us accept his picture theory of meaning in the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein established an order in our knowledge of the use of language, that is, the pragmatic or instrumentalist conception of language, with a particular end in view -dissolving philosophical problems (Mosier 1967, p. 123). Although he now realizes that the sense and nonsense distinction are vague terms in ordinary language, nevertheless it is possible to draw a boundary according to the established order for a particular purpose. This is achieved with the concept of meaning as use in the *Investigations* when Wittgenstein advises us to look at the ordinary uses of language as a machine doing its work.

Lastly, Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning as conceived in the *Tractatus* has an idealized expectation of the role of language in Philosophy that is essentially teleological (Koehler 1968, p. 39). And anything short of the picture theory of meaning was considered a deviation from the standard expectation and appropriate usage of language. The picture theory of meaning has an assumption of language that is not only very rigid in its conception but also fails to take into consideration the evolutionary nature of language. Thanks to Wittgenstein's latter concept of meaning as use, we now have a more flexible and socially considerate view of language.

Conclusion

The attempt by Wittgenstein to dissolve the philosophical problem of language had brought about two unique theories of language: picture theory of meaning and meaning as use in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* respectively. However, in spite of the uniqueness of both perspectives of language as posited by Wittgenstein, in our comparative analysis, we did argue in support of his latter view: meaning as use. Language use is an activity that is a quintessential hallmark of humans and unlike the picture theory of meaning that narrowly emphasis the symbolic or representative function of language, the concept of meaning as use is less rigid and accommodates the intricate and diverse functions of language.

Reference:

[1] Charlesworth, M. J. (1961). *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis.* USA: Pittsburgh. p. 76.
[2] Fann, K. T. (1969). *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.* Britain: Oxford Basil Blackwell.
[3] Hacker, P. M. S. (1996). *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy,* Oxford: Blackwell.
[4] Koehier, C. J. (1968). "A Study of in Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning." *Kinesis* (Graduate Journal in Philosophy, Southern Illinois University). pp. 36-42.

[5] Kulkami, N. G. (1968). "Wittgenstein's Theory of Experience." *Journal of the (Indian) Philosophical Association* 11. pp. 27-35.

[6] Mosier, R. D. (1967). "Reflections on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein" *Philosophy of Education: Proceedings* 23. pp. 121-6.

[7] Spiegelberg, H. (1968). "The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's Phenomenology". *American Philosophical Quarterly* 5. pp. 224-256.

[8] Sullivan, P. and Potter, M. (eds.). (2013). *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[9] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP). (Oct. 20, 2021). Ludwig Wittgenstein https://plato.stanford.edulenlries!wittgenstein/.

[10] Wittgenstein, L. (1974). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* Trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness. USA, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[11] Wittgenstein, L. (1958) (1989). *Philosophical Investigations.* Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe. UK, Oxford: Basil Black Well Ltd.